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Abstract—Social Media Aggregator (SMA) applications present
a platform enabling users to manage multiple Social Network-
ing Sites (SNS) in one convenient application, which results in a
unique concentration of data from several SNS accounts in ad-
dition to the user’s mobile phone data available to them. In this
paper, we provide a detailed privacy assessment of 13 popular
SMAs from 3 app stores by using a three-step methodology
by inspecting the mobile data and social media data accessed
by these applications, checking for privacy policies and their
compliance with distributors’ vetting policies and performing a
qualitative assessment of traceability between privacy policies
and the actual transparency and control mechanisms offered
to users by the apps’ interfaces. Our results demonstrate a
variation in data accessed by the individual applications, an
absence of privacy policies for 5 of the SMAs evaluated, and a
lack of traceability between privacy policies and transparency
and control of interface operations.
1. Introduction
It is evident that our engagement with Social Networking
Sites (SNS) is becoming ever more ingrained in our daily
lives. This has been, in part, facilitated by the spectacular
growth of mobile social networking, which has a worldwide
penetration of 23% (1.7 billion). This proliferation of mo-
bile devices have enabled the users to access social media
accounts with more ease and convenience. This is demon-
strated by the huge surge in usage of social applications on
mobile platform to the extent that an estimated 80% of time
spent on social media is using mobile applications1.
This shift towards the mobile platform for social media
activity has led to the development of Social Media Aggre-
gators (SMAs) which enable users to access all of their so-
cial media accounts from a single application. This is partly
driven by the fact that users are often found to have accounts
on multiple Social Networking Sites (SNSs)2. It can be quite
attractive to users to use SMAs, a single application for
all social media accounts, compared to installing separate
applications for all their social media sites. An additional




media applications is also related to better utilization of the
often limited resources (RAM, CPU power and battery) of
the mobile phone itself. Indeed, many SMAs clearly convey
this to potential customers as an advantage and a selling
poin.t
While it is clear that SMAs can be beneficial for users,
they also potentially introduce severe privacy risks for users.
Users are meant to use SMAs to combine multiple social
media accounts and all the activity is routed through a single
SMA. This is different from using separate applications
for different social media accounts as a user’s Facebook
application, for example, cannot access their Twitter activity
unless an explicit link is made by the user. Such a link
between various social media profiles is implicit in the case
of SMAs. Moreover, this information about social media
activity is augmented with mobile device data such as GPS
location, contact lists, camera, etc. Given this potential threat
to the privacy of social media users, it is essential to take
a closer look at the transparency and control mechanisms
offered by these applications. This understanding will help
further in-depth analysis of gaps in policy and technology
which are required to be overcome in order to safeguard
user privacy and enable appropriate usage of SMAs.
In this paper, we employ a three-step methodology to
perform, to the best of our knowledge, the first detailed
privacy assessment of SMAs. We begin by looking at the
Data Permissions requested by SMAs. This includes both
mobile data as well as social media data of the user. We then
check whether the SMAs have relevant Privacy Policies or
other related documentation which explain the collection,
usage and purpose of the user data being collected by them.
Finally, we qualitatively analyze the privacy policies and
perform a Traceability Analysis where we evaluate whether
the interface provided to the users are congruent with docu-
mented policies to evaluate how transparent data collection
is and whether users have a control over the amount and
nature of data being collected.
We report the results we obtained for 13 popular SMAs
from 3 app stores, showing: a variety in the data accessed,
especially when it comes to mobile data; a partial lack
of privacy policies (5 out of the 13 SMAs do not have
privacy policies); and that a substantial proportion (45%) of
SMAs show Broken traceability between policy documenta-
tion and interface operation whereas Complete traceability
is observed in only 19% of the cases.
2. Methodology
We begin by listing the various SMAs we have con-
sidered in our research along with their sources. We have
surveyed 13 popular SMAs for this research. We studied
the 6 most popular SMAs (in terms of reviews and installs)
each from Google Play Store and iTunes. Additionally, we
included a Cydia SMA to account for the variation between
SMAs with different levels of adoption as well as between
different app stores that have different vetting procedures or
policies (e.g., Cydia only works on rooted iOS devices and
does not have a vetting process in place). The SMAs are
listed with their platform, number of times they have been
rated and the number of times they have been downloaded
(wherever available)3 in Table 1. Note that number of re-
views was not available for Social Butter and Social hub
as there were not enough reviews for iTunes to publish the
number. The iOS version on the phone which was used to
install these apps was 10.2 while the Android version used
was 5.0. It is important to note however, that the findings
reported in this paper are independent of the version of OS
and versions of individual apps.
2.1. Examining Data Permissions
The first step of our analysis requires us to identify
exactly which SMAs request permissions to access personal
data from the user. All mobile applications are required to
request permission for the data they access on the user’s
phone. We compare the permissions requested by the 13
SMAs included in our analysis. It is important to note here
that applications asking for permissions of any data from the
user does not mean they are actually accessing it. However,
it means that this data is available to them with the consent
of the user (demonstrated by granting the access permission
while using the application).
Most applications have a “permissions screen” which is
shown to the user to communicate the list of mobile data
access permissions requested by the application (refer to Fig.
1). However, for the analysis, in addition to the permissions
screens, we also looked at the phone settings section for
the individual permissions the applications were using. Both
Android and iOS display the data access permissions for
each application installed on the mobile phone. We also
checked the permissions granted to individual SMAs by us-
ing “Permissions Manager” application on Android devices.
Only permissions which were specified explicitly in either
the permission screen or the phone settings (or seen using
“Permissions Manager” on Android SMAs) were included
in our results.
We examine the social network data (such as profile
information, communication, lists, etc.) that are accessed
by the SMAs separately. This helps us to understand exactly
what information each SMA will try to have access for each
of the SNS the user will associate to the SMA. To look at
this, we created social media accounts and then authorized
3. These figures were found from the respective app stores and are
accurate as of 9th February, 2017.
TABLE 1: The 13 SMAs evaluated,the app stores they
belong to, number of reviews and downloads when available.
SMA Platform No. of Installs
Reviews
iSocial Cydia − −
Hootsuite Google Play 80760 1000k - 5000k
Buffer Google Play 24948 500k - 1000k
Social Networking Google Play 18336 1000k - 5000k
all in one
Social Media Google Play 11106 1000k - 5000k
all in one
Everypost Google Play 4502 100k - 500k
Social Media Google Play 1392 100k - 500k
Hootsuite iTunes 4865 −
Buffer iTunes 1150 −
Everypost iTunes 138 −
Social Media Vault iTunes 12 −
Social butter iTunes N/A −
Social hub iTunes N/A −
Figure 1: Mobile data access permissions required by Hoot-
suites on Android device
the individual SMAs. We then checked the social media
site to see what permissions the SMA had been granted.
The permissions can also be checked by the user when the
SMA is used to log in to a particular social network account
for the first time.
Beyond the data permissions that can be checked using
the mobile phone (for mobile data) or the SNS (for social
media data), there may be other data (e.g. traffic data) which
can be collected. This is examined later in this paper as part
of the traceability analysis.
2.2. Privacy Policies
The next step in our analysis was to examine the privacy
policies of the individual SMAs. In some cases, the relevant
document was titled differently (such as “Terms of Service”)
but we refer to all privacy related documentation as privacy
policies for simplicity. The aim of this evaluation was to
check for compliance with distributor vetting policies. The
3 app stores included in our research are:
1) Cydia: It does not have an official vetting process for
its applications.
2) iTunes Store: It has a vetting process which reviews all
applications.4 Personally identifiable information may
not be collected or used without the user’s consent.
More generally, privacy policies are required if an
application stores, shares or uses personal data.
4. https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/
3) Google Play Store: It has a vetting process which
looks at app permissions and outlines the application
provider agreement to protect the privacy and legal
rights of users.5 If an application accesses registration
or personal information, users must be made aware of
this, and an adequate privacy policy must be provided
in appliance with the law.
2.3. Mapping Traceability
Finally, we performed a qualitative analysis of the
privacy related documentation to facilitate the traceability
analysis with transparency and control interface operations.
Previous research has identified a methodology for analysing
software requirements from privacy policies [1]. Concepts,
categorized as a commitment, privilege or right, are attained
from statements by identifying helping verbs, and used to
produce a set of software requirements. Similarly, we use
content analysis to identify action statements through verbs
that we then categorize into privacy implications, which
are split into categories by way of answering the following
questions:
1) What information is collected by the application?
2) What is the purpose of collection?
3) Who can access this information?
4) How long is information retained?
These privacy implications help us in contextualizing
the traceability analysis. In particular, we map the extent to
which application features and controls match expectations
set out to users as data actions in privacy policies or appli-
cation interfaces. By measuring the traceability of privacy
policy implications in application content, we can assess the
extent to which data transparency and control are delivered
to the user.
For those applications with privacy policies, information
provided in these documents present a means of gathering
expectations for this analysis. A method for traceability anal-
ysis of SNS is presented by Anthonysamy, et al. [2] where
action statements identified in privacy policies are mapped to
those in interface operations by way of assessing the extent
to which data actions are controllable by users. We applied
a similar methodology to SMAs and extended it to consider
mobile phone data and the transparency of interface opera-
tions. In Anthonysamy’s methodology, privacy implications
found in policies are matched to corresponding operations
available through interfaces during installation and use of
the application. We have defined actions of privacy policies
as privacy implications, and define features and controls
of an application as its operations. Also, and extending
upon Anthonysamy’s methodology, our study aims to iden-
tify the traceability of data privacy implications through
interface awareness mechanisms. Therefore we assess the
transparency of data actions through interface operations,
as well as controls.
For SMAs with privacy policies, transparency of data
usage is analyzed, mapping information provided in the pri-
vacy policy, to that presented through application operations.
5. https://play.google.com/about/developer-distribution-agreement.html
Traceability between data actions and the extent to which
we control each privacy implication is the second aspect for
analysis. In this way we map privacy implications to data
transparency and control operations for SMA applications
with privacy policies, by carrying out the following steps.
For each privacy implication identified:
1) Identify a corresponding interface operation by match-
ing terminology of data actions.
2) Assess the transparency of data actions made visible to
the user through interface operations, contrasting data
actions in privacy policies.
3) Assess the extent of user control on data actions
through operations, mapping data visible in the pre-
vious step (2) with control operations.
We measure the extent to which privacy implications are
transparent and controllable through user interfaces against
three main categories; complete, partial and broken in a
similar way as in Anthonysamy, et al. [2], but specifying
the categories both for transparency and control:
Complete mappings signify complete transparency of
information presented to the user, through both transparency
and control operations. Information presented to users is un-
ambiguous; with unmistakable meaning and appropriate de-
tail. For transparency, complete traceability can be achieved
by providing accurate information to the user through the
user interface. An example is when a user is accurately
informed about all data being accessed by an app through
the permission screen. The control operation is mapped as
complete when the user can regulate this list and can choose
to withhold certain items of information.
Partial mappings involve ambiguous information pro-
vided in privacy documentation or data operations. For
example, vague terms like ‘personal information’, which are
not explicitly defined, make mapping data operations diffi-
cult. Access permissions are partial data operations because
they do not inform users of all data collected. Hootsuite
collects location and traffic data, much like most other appli-
cations. Although we are prompted for permission regarding
location access, the application does not provide any infor-
mation on the user of traffic data collection. Control over a
privacy implication is found to be partial when incomplete,
with some control provided but not all data collected have
associated controls. Taking Everypost as another example,
we find partial control operations are evident for traffic data
collected. Everypost’s privacy policy6 states that cookies
used by third parties may be opted out of, as is apparent
through interface operations. However, collection of traffic
data for internal usage such as analytics does not match any
control operations.
Broken mappings occur when there is a disconnect
between privacy implication expectations and application
operations. Control operation mappings are broken when
documented expectancies and/or data transparency opera-
tions do not have a matching control. Detachment from
policy expectations is apparent among privacy implications
such as advertising and aggregation. These purposes for
6. http://everypost.me/privacy-policy/
TABLE 2: Mobile data accessed by each SMA
SMA Identity Photos Location Contacts Wi-Fi Camera Mic Device ID SMS Phone Network In App USB
/Media & Call info Access Purchases Storage
iSocial 3 − − − − − − − − − 3 − −
Hootsuite 3 3 3 − 3 − − − − − 3 3 3
Buffer 3 3 − − − 3 − − − − 3 3 3
Social Networking − − 3 − 3 − − − − − 3 − −
all in one
Social Media − 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 − 3
all in one
Everypost 3 3 3 3 3 − − − − − 3 3 −
Social Media − − 3 − − − − − − − 3 − −
Hootsuite 3 3 3 − 3 − − − − − 3 3 3
Buffer 3 3 − − − 3 − − − − 3 3 3
Everypost 3 3 3 3 3 − − − − − 3 3 −
Social Media Vault − − 3 − − 3 − − − − 3 − −
Social butter − 3 3 − − 3 − − − − 3 − −
Social hub − 3 3 3 − − − 3 − 3 3 − −
Key: Yes: 3 No: −
data collection are expressed in privacy policies but no
corresponding information is provided through application
data or control operations. Likewise implications of age
restriction in concern to data retention are expressed in
policies with disconnect to interface operations.
There are many cases in which there is an absence of a
clear traceability mapping between privacy implications and
interface operations. We have classified these applications as
Unknown and represented them in our analysis.
Apart from the above 4 classifications, there are some
cases where the privacy implication was not applicable to a
particular SMA. In such cases, we have represented this as
N/A in our analysis. The detailed results of our analysis is
presented in section 4.3.
3. Results
3.1. Data Access Permissions
3.1.1. Mobile Data Access Permissions. As can be seen
from the results in Table 2, most applications require ac-
cess to photos/media, location, identity, which refers to any
user accounts on the phone accessed by the application,
and network access. In addition, many application require
access to the USB storage as well. These findings confirm
that personal data of the user is accessed by most of the
application that were analyzed. An interesting observation
is that permissions seem consistent for the same SMA
developers across app stores. However, for different SMAs
we observe a wide variety in the mobile data being accessed.
While this could be attributed to different functionality being
provided, it may also be a sign of some SMAs asking for
more permissions than required [3], as arguably one of the
most mature and used SMA (Hootsuite, which has 100,000-
500,000 installs and 80760 reviews on Google Play, refer
Table 1) seems to use a relatively smaller set of permissions
when compared to other SMAs. An interesting case is that
of Social Media all in one, which seems to access everything
except Identity (which can be obtained from SNSs anyway).
3.1.2. Social Media Data Access Permissions. SMAs are
different from other mobile applications as they can access
a user’s social media data as well. We have summarized
the data permissions requested by SMAs while a user logs
into their social media accounts in Table 3. We have used
general terms such as “Activity” and “Lists” in this table to
simply convey the meaning as each social media site uses
different names for such features. For example, “posts” on
Facebook and “tweets” on Twitter as well as inbox messages
are classified under “Activity”. Similarly, “Lists” refers to
groups or lists that the user might have created (or used by
default) to organize their contacts on various social media
sites.
We can find in Table 3 that 5 SMAs, namely, iSocial,
Social Networking All in One, Social Media all in one,
Social Media and Social Media Vault are marked with a ‘ *
’ sign and are shown to access all social media data. This is
to highlight the fact that these applications do not disclose
what social media data they access to function as they just
provide an interface for either the social media apps (such as
Facebook, Twitter) already installed on the user’s phone or
to the web link of the social network via the web browser. As
all the social media activity goes via these applications, they
have the potential to access all communication. Moreover,
these applications do not require to be authorized by the
user with their Facebook account so the user cannot regulate
the permissions by logging into their Facebook account as
is possible with other Facebook applications. For the other
SMAs, we find that many of them access almost all social
media activity such as posting on walls/tweeting, access the
friend or contact lists, update the profile on the users’ behalf,
post on their behalf, access to inbox messages or the email
ID which was used to create the account. Needless to say, all
this information may be classified as personal and sensitive
to the user and we find that most applications who disclose
the permissions access this information.
3.2. Application Privacy Policies
Applications that collect personally identifiable infor-
mation are required to produce a privacy policy in order
to comply with the previously discussed distributor vetting
policies. Table 4 shows that 8 out of the 13 SMAs that we
evaluated were found to include this documentation. The
lack of privacy policies among the other 5 SMAs seems to
suggest a violation of the distributor vetting policies which
mandate such documentation for all applications which pro-
cess personal data from users. We did find in Table 2 that
TABLE 3: Social media data accessed by each SMA
SMA Activity Lists Update Post Messages Email
Profile ID
iSocial* 3 3 3 3 3 3
Hootsuite 3 3 3 3 3 3
Buffer 3 3 3 3 3 3
Social Networking* 3 3 3 3 3 3
all in one
Social Media* 3 3 3 3 3 3
all in one
Everypost − 3 − 3 − 3
Social Media* 3 3 3 3 3 3
Hootsuite 3 3 3 3 3 3
Buffer 3 3 3 3 3 3
Everypost − 3 − 3 − 3
Social Media Vault* − 3 − − − 3
Social butter − 3 − − − 3
Social hub 3 − − − − 3
Key: Yes: 3 No: −
the SMAs without a privacy policy do not access “Identity”,
so technically they may argue they do not access personally
identifying information. However, they are found to be able
to access most of the social media data, photos, location,
etc., which can be classified as personal information.
3.3. Traceability for Transparency and Control
Common data actions have been categorized to form
14 privacy implications seen in the left column of Table 5.
Privacy implications fall under further categories by way of
answering our privacy questions set out in section 3.3; col-
lection, purpose, access and retention of data. Operations
refer to features provided by SMA providers or distributors
which inform us of data collection and use as well as
providing us with control over data actions. Each symbol
in the table provides a mapping to the degree of traceability
offered by transparency and control operations respectively.
Data operations refer to the extent to which transparency of
data actions is presented to the user through interfaces, these
include access permission prompts and other mechanisms
which detail privacy implications. Control operations refer
to features and mechanisms presented through interfaces
which enable control over some data action, these include
device settings, accept/decline button options etc. If the same
degree is found for both transparency and control operations
assessed, then only one symbol need be provided in repre-
sentation. If a different degree of traceability is found, the
first symbol in the particular cell of the table corresponds to
transparency operations and the second symbol corresponds
to control operations. In the resulting table, we refer to
content as the social media data collected shown in Table
3. Other privacy implications and results will be further
explained and justified in the following subsections.
3.3.1. Complete. All SMAs provide control over some
data collection through access permissions. iSocial does not
specify any such method of informing the user of data col-
lected through the requirement to accept access permissions.
iSocial’s terms and conditions specifies privacy implications;
“Any site registration information is used only by the web-
site and is not sold or given out to others”, likewise users
may provide an email address for the service provider to
provide support. Complete transparency for collection can
be found when an SMA communicates the data its going to
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Social Media Vault −
Social butter −
Social hub 3
Key: Yes: 3 No: −
TABLE 5: Traceability mappings represent transparency and

















Mobile Data G# G# G# G# G# G# G#  
Social Media Data G# G#  G# − − G# G# l
Traffic Data 6 6 G# 6 6 G# G# 6
Purpose
Services 6G#        
Internal use 6 G# G# 6 6 6 6 6
Asset transfer ? 6 6  ?  ? 6 6 6
Advertising G# 6G# − − − − 6G# 6
Aggregation 6 6 6 6 6 − − ?
Access
Service Provider G# G# G# G# G# G# G# 6
3rd party by user G#  6  6  6  6    
3rd party by provider 6G# 6 6 − − ? ? 6
Legality 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Retention
Age Restriction G# 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Information 6 6 6 − − 6 6 −
Key:
Complete:  Partial: G# Broken: 6 Unknown: ? N/A: −
access to the user through the interface operations. Fig 2a
shows Hootsuite’s permissions screen which tells the user
about the social media data that will be accessed by it.
Complete traceability mapping for control operations are
when a user can regulate the access permissions through
interface operations (such as Fig. 2b which shows Hootsuite
for iOS).
(a) Notification of So-
cial Media data access by
Hootsuite
(b) iOS settings enabling
users to restrict permis-
sions
Figure 2: Transparency and control operations
Users have control over content provided for use by ser-
vices, through accepting access permissions and the posting
of information. Sharing information intentionally with SNS
involves sharing this with these third parties by users, the
transparency of third party access is completely apparent
to the user in this case. Some applications offer settings
which enable the user a level of control over who accesses
information posted to SNS, and the restriction of data access
to particular accounts. Controls offered are as found on
common SNS; share with only friends or everyone. Asset
transfer refers to personally identifiable information being
transferred as businesses buy and sell assets.
3.3.2. Partial. The transparency of privacy implications
through access permissions maps only partially to expec-
tations provided by SMA privacy policies. An example of
which is partial content collection made visible and con-
trollable to the user. SMAs with privacy policies commonly
state their rights to collect all information provided to the
site, including shared with associated SNS. Google Play’s
Hootsuite provides a ‘Send usage data’ setting; the user
is informed anonymous data is collected which is used to
help improve Hootsuite. Partial transparency and control
over internal use is apparent, with an ambiguous description
collection and purpose, along with control over ‘anonymous
data’ but no matching control for all data collected as
specified in the privacy policy, such as content posted.
3.3.3. Broken. Internal use of data includes analytics used
to improve or better understand services. It is common for
servers to automatically collect usage information; “Server
logs may include such information as a mobile device
identification number and device identifier, web requests,
IP address, browser type, browser language, referring/exit
pages and URLs, platform type, number of clicks, domain
names, search terms, landing pages ...”, the list goes on
and on. This type of information collected is referred to
as the traffic data privacy implication, and may be shared
with third parties on an aggregate basis for advertising and
analytic purposes. We can see that both transparency and
control for this example are broken in most SMAs, leaving
users unaware in their normal use through the interface of
the collection of this data and without a way of controlling
that in any shape or form.
3.3.4. Unknown. Analyzed traceability mapping of data use
as specified in privacy policies has shown us not to expect
applications to inform users about the passive collection of
non-identifiable information. We are aware that providers
are likely to use and share traffic or aggregate data with
third parties, for the purpose of analytics and advertising.
We are unable to determine whether an application without
a privacy policy passively collects such non-identifiable
information. Therefore, for some SMAs, data disclosure to
3rd parties by the provider are shown to be unknown.
3.3.5. Summary. Table 6 summarizes our results, present-
ing rounded percentages of privacy implications found to
be complete, partial, broken, unknown or not applicable.
We provide a breakdown for each of the 3 app stores.
TABLE 6: Summary of traceability mappings
Complete Partial Broken Unknown N/A
Cydia
Transp. 29% 0% 57% 7% 7%
Control 29% 0% 57% 7% 7%
Total 29% 0% 57% 7% 7%
Android
Transp. 17% 24% 43% 2% 14%
Control 17% 19% 45% 5% 14%
Total 17% 21% 44% 4% 14%
iOS
Transp. 14% 27% 45% 4% 11%
Control 22% 17% 45% 5% 11%
Total 18% 22% 45% 4% 11%
Overall
Transp. 17% 23% 45% 4% 12%
Control 21% 16% 46% 5% 12%
Total 19% 19% 45% 4% 12%
The overall traceability of transparency and control are also
provided.
4. Discussion
In this section we analyse and discuss the main findings
according to the results detailed in the previous section
organized into the four areas described below.
4.1. Divergence in Data Accessed
SMAs are different from other mobile applications as
they represent the unique set of circumstances where a user’s
mobile data (such as call records, contact list, location,
camera, etc.) as well as their social media activity can be
collected. This very nature of SMAs make them critical
from a privacy perspective. We have seen from our results
that most of the SMAs analyzed in this study access a
lot of personal data form the mobile phone as well as the
social media data (such as activity, lists, etc.) of the user.
This combination of mobile phone data and social media
data makes SMAs an important threat to user privacy. It is
important to acknowledge this threat and attempt to reduce
the privacy risks for users of such applications and enable
them to enjoy the benefits of concatenating their social
media accounts through SMAs.
We largely found that permissions were similar for same
developers across different app stores so vetting processes
do not affect a great deal. We did also find a wide variety in
the amount of permissions required by the different SMAs.
This may be because many SMAs are asking for more
permissions than required which reinforces well documented
concerns [3]. This is also suggested by the fact that one
of the most mature SMAs, Hootsuite, requires less data
permissions to function than many others.
4.2. Partial Lack of Privacy Policies
Analysis of distributor policies found few measures that
attempt to preserve user privacy, namely the requirement
for providers to fashion a privacy policy and gain consent
from users when collecting personal information. Over three
popular application stores, only eight free SMA applications
could be identified which present a privacy policy. Results
do not indicate that providers are breaking these rules, but
rather that mobile applications commonly circumvent the
need to inform users of data actions performed on what
is perceived as non-personal information. We did find in
Table 2 that the three SMAs without a privacy policy do not
access “Identity”, so technically they do not access personal
information. However, they are found to be able to access
most of the social media data, photos, location, etc., which
can be classified as personal information.
A possible reason for the failure to provide privacy poli-
cies may be the effort and expertise required to produce such
documents. A possible mitigation can be found in automated
solutions like “AutoPPG” which is an automatic privacy
policy generator for Android applications [4]. It simply
identifies the important privacy issues emanating from the
usage of the application by conducting a static analysis of
the application’s source code. Automated solutions such as
these may encourage SMA and other application developers
to include privacy policies without putting in much effort.
4.3. Lack of Transparency and Control
We find a general lack of transparency across SMAs
with 45 percent of SMAs revealing broken transparency
mappings. Privacy implications offering complete trans-
parency of data involve collection of personal information
made visible to the user through in some way (e.g. showing
the access permissions required). In order to consider current
guidelines for user privacy as adequate, we must rule out
mistrust between the user’s expectations and reality of how
SMAs treat their information by making them aware, either
through privacy policies or through other awareness mech-
anisms, of any data collected, how it will be used, whom it
will be shared with, and how long it will be retained.
We also find that users have a lack of control as less
than a quarter of the results indicated complete control over
privacy implications. In order to give more control to users,
developers could work to increase application functionality
while restricting access to data. Settings should enable con-
trol over all data collected, including information perceived
as non-identifiable. Research has shown that pragmatic ap-
proaches of providing privacy related intervention, where
users are shown the effect of exposures of their data, work
well [5].
5. Related Work
5.1. Analysis of Mobile Data Access Permissions
Mobile applications generally are explicit in disclosing
the data access permissions they require to the users. There
is generally a screen which is shown to the user at the time
of installation which tells them the data that the particular
application will be allowed to access. The major issue is
the “all or nothing” nature of mobile applications [6], [7].
The user is required to grant the requested permissions to
the application for them to use it. This is a problem as
it has been shown that mobile applications often introduce
risk vectors by asking for more permissions than required
[3], [8]. The problem is that the applications are somewhat
hamstrung in this regard and have to request for permissions
that they envisage using at any time during execution. There
have been some solutions put forth to detect and possibly
prevent malicious mobile applications by using anomaly
detection to detect applications behaving maliciously and
in a deviant manner from normally expected behavior [9].
The idea is to use static analysis to create profiles of
applications’ expected behavior and detect anomalies at run-
time to secure mobile applications. This is similar to the
work of Hussain et al. which looks at detecting malicious
database applications [10]. Another proposed approach,
“PrivacyGuard” uses the VPN service of Android devices
to intercept network traffic of mobile applications to detect
information leakage [11]. It also provides mechanisms
of tricking the malicious applications by manipulating the
leaked information. Awareness mechanisms such as privacy
“nudges” have also been found to be reasonably successful
as a deterrent for some users [12]. Recommending mobile
apps to users by providing information about the security
and privacy aspects has also been suggested [13]. However,
we found that most of the previous work in this area only
looks at leakage of mobile data and not social media data
which SMAs have access to as well.
5.2. Analysis of Privacy Policy Traceability
There is previous work which shows that control over
data disclosure can affect decisions made by users [14].
Greater transparency about data being shared often acts
as a mitigating factor against erroneous decisions being
made. Privacy policies are often employed to inform the
user about the information that is being collected and ac-
cessed and are hence an instrument of transparency form the
users’ perspective. However, the readability of these privacy
policies (or related documentation) has often been found
to be inadequate [15], [16]. Moreover, studies have also
demonstrated the lack of usability and correctness in privacy
controls in SNSs which make it extremely difficult for the
average user to configure them appropriately [17], [18].
Given how separate analysis of transparency and control
has found significant problems, our current work looks at
the traceability for transparency and control by looking
at the interface operations and how closely they match
with privacy policies. Qualitative analysis of documented
policies and analyzing traceability with interface features
has been explored earlier in software engineering by looking
at complaince of documented software requirements with
legal texts or described privacy policies [1], [19], [20]. More
recently, such analysis has been used to analyze whether the
privacy policies outlined by SNSs are congruent with the
interface controls provided to the users. Anthonysamy et al.
demonstrated that SNSs themselves suffer from a lack of
traceability between data actions defined in privacy policies
and corresponding data operations apparent to users through
interfaces [2], [21]. Our work extends this methodology
to perform a privacy analysis for SMAs by performing an
analysis of the mobile phone data and social media data
accessed by the SMAs in addition to a traceability mapping
which considers the transparency of interface operations and
the control provided to the user.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we employed a three-step methodology to
provide the first of its kind privacy assessment of SMAs
by examining the data (both mobile and social media) per-
missions requested by them, checking whether they provide
the user with privacy related documentation and analyzing
traceability between privacy implications identified in the
privacy policy with the interface operations provided to the
user. We evaluated 13 popular Social Media Aggregators
(SMAs) from 3 app stores and found that the majority of the
SMAs we evaluated accessed users’ personal information in-
cluding their social media activity. However, we also found
that 5 of the 13 SMAs did not provide any privacy related
documentation which is in clear conflict with the vetting
policies of the app stores. Our results show that 45% of
SMAs show Broken traceability between privacy documen-
tation and interface operations while Complete traceability
is observed in only 19% of the cases. These results highlight
the need for major improvements to ensure that the usage
of SMAs does not compromise user privacy.
Future research in this area would benefit by considering
main motivators of data privacy mechanisms, by way of
seeking initiatives for providers to improve traceability of
data implications. Efforts to reuse the methodology used in
this paper may find it beneficial, but also challenging, to
automate the traceability analysis which is the costliest part
in terms of time and effort. Research could also seek to
identify improved regulations for data privacy, with particu-
lar concern to non-identifiable personal information. Finally,
SMAs are different from other mobile applications as they
have an inherent link to the social media activity of users.
In this paper, our main focus was on highlighting the ab-
sence of traceability between privacy policies and interface
operations. However, research on online SNSs show that
users struggle with the social aspects of privacy on these
platforms due to the complex nature of their networks and
interpersonal relationships [22]. Similar analysis of privacy
mechanisms, particularly from a social standpoint, for SMAs
may be of particular interest to consider both so-called
institutional and social privacy [23].
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